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Universal Secure Multiplex Network Coding with
Dependent and Non-Uniform Messages
Ryutaroh Matsumoto, Member, IEEE, and Masahito Hayashi, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the random linear precoder at the
source node as a secure network coding. We prove that it is
strongly secure in the sense of Harada and Yamamoto [23]
and universal secure in the sense of Silva and Kschischang
[35], [36], while allowing arbitrary small but nonzero mutual
information to the eavesdropper. Our security proof allows
statistically dependent and non-uniform multiple secret messages,
while all previous constructions of weakly or strongly secure
network coding assumed independent and uniform messages,
which are difficult to be ensured in practice.
Index Terms—information theoretic security, network coding,
secure multiplex coding, strongly secure network coding
I. Introduction
Network coding [1] attracts much attention recently because
it can offer improvements in several metrics, such as through-
put and energy consumption, see [19], [20]. On the other hand,
the information theoretic security [5], [32] also attracts much
attention because it offers security that does not depend on a
conjectured difficulty of some computational problem.
A juncture of the network coding and the information
theoretic security is the secure network coding [8], [11],
which prevents an eavesdropper, called Eve, from knowing
the message from the legitimate sender, called Alice, to the
multiple legitimate receivers by eavesdropping intermediate
links up to a specified number in a network. In this paper,
we focus on the single source multicast network coding. Here,
we should remark that there are two kinds of formulation of
(secure) network coding even in the single source multicast
setting. In the first kind, given a graph corresponding to the
network, we design the coding operations on each node to
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transmit information [13]. In the second kind, given (partial)
information of the operations on intermediate nodes as well as
the graph, we design the encoder and decoder on source and
sink nodes, respectively. We adopt the second formulation, and
assume linearity on the operations on intermediate nodes.
It can be seen [15], [16] as a network coding counterpart
of the traditional wiretap channel coding problem considered
by Wyner [38] and subsequently others [32]. In both secure
network coding and coding for wiretap channels, the secrecy is
realized by including random bits into the transmitted signal
by Alice so that the secret message becomes ambiguous to
Eve. The inclusion of random bits, of course, decreases the
information rate. In order to get rid of the decrease in the
information rate, Yamamoto et al. [27], [28] proposed the
secure multiplex coding for wiretap channels, in which there
is no loss of information rate. The idea of Yamamoto et al. is
as follows: Suppose that Alice has T statistically independent
messages S 1, . . . , S T . Then S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T serve
as the random bits making S i ambiguous to Eve, for each
i. Indeed, since there are multiple legitimate receivers, each
receiver may have a different demand for information. In this
situation, it is natural that we have multiple messages S 1, . . . ,
S T dependently on receivers’ demands.
Independently and simultaneously, Bhattad and Narayanan
[3] proposed a scheme based on the same idea as [27], [28],
whose goal is also to get rid of the loss of information rate
in the secure network coding. This scheme was called weakly
secure network coding in [3]. Their method [3] ensures that
the mutual information between S i and Eve’s information
is zero for each i. Recall that Eve’s knowledge on secret
information S i is usually measured by the mutual information
in the information theoretic security [5], [32]. As drawbacks,
the construction depends on the network topology and coding
at intermediate nodes, and the computational complexity of
code construction is large.
Harada and Yamamoto [23] defined a stronger security
requirement on the weakly secure network coding, which will
be reviewed later, and called it as the strongly secure network
coding. Then they showed its construction procedure. As [3],
the construction depends on the network topology and coding
at intermediate nodes, and the computational complexity of
code construction is large.
In order to remove these drawbacks, Silva and Kschis-
chang [35] proposed a scheme called universal weakly secure
network coding, in which they showed an efficient code
construction that can support up to two Fq-symbols in each
S i and is independent of the network topology and coding at
intermediate nodes, where Fq denotes the finite field with q
elements throughout this paper. The independence of coding
2at the source node from network topology and coding at inter-
mediate nodes is termed universal by Silva and Kschischang
in [35], [36]. They [35] also showed the existence of universal
weakly secure network coding with more than two Fq-symbols
in S i, but have not shown an explicit construction.
Cai [6] removed most of drawbacks mentioned earlier. Cai
proved that random linear network coding [26] gives the
strongly secure network coding in the sense of [23] with
arbitrarily high probability with sufficiently large finite fields.
However, he did not provide evaluation of the required field
size, and it seems huge. Moreover, for some applications (e.g.
[9], [39]) we want to choose coding at intermediate nodes in
non-random fashion.
There exists a common difficulty in all the previous con-
structions reviewed above. In practice, we are not sure if the
multiple messages are uniform and statistically independent.
However, all the previous studies1 assumed the uniformity and
the independence, and without both of them their security
proofs do not seem to hold. It is important to provide a
security proof for weakly and strongly secure network coding
without uniformity or independence assumption. On the other
hand, non-uniformity of secret messages has been considered
in the ordinary secure network coding [10], [40] (see also
the survey [7]). In [7], [10], [40], the randomness to hide a
secret message was assumed to be statistically independent of
the secret message, while our present study allows it to be
statistically dependent.
We shall analyze the security of a slightly modified con-
struction of the random linear precoder originally proposed
in [8]. Our modified construction is strongly secure in the
sense of [23] and universal secure in the sense of [35], [36].
Uniformity and the independence assumptions are required in
previous works to guarantee security. This paper relaxed the
assumptions and aims to determine the amount of information
leakage if the two conditions are not satisfied. The optimality
of our modified construction is verified under the uniformity
and independence assumption at the end of Remark 10.
However, we relax an aspect of the security requirements
traditionally used in the secure network coding. In previous
proposals of secure network coding [3], [8], [23], [35], [36]
it is required that the mutual information to the eavesdrop-
per is exactly zero. We relax this requirement by regarding
sufficiently small mutual information to be acceptable. This
relaxation is similar to requiring the decoding error probability
to be sufficiently small instead of strictly zero. Also observe
that our relaxed criterion is much stronger than one commonly
used in the information theoretic security [32]. Our modified
construction can realize arbitrary small mutual information
if coding over sufficiently many symbols in single packet is
allowed.
Up to this point, we have followed the conventional usage
of terminology “strong security” and “weak security” in secure
network coding. On the other hand, in the context of key
agreement and wiretap channel coding and “strong security”
1Cai [6] considered arbitrary probability distribution in [6, Theorem 3.2]
but assumed uniformity and independence for his study of the strongly secure
network coding in [6, Section IV].
and “weak security” mean completely different security cri-
teria [4]. We shall introduce a different terminology “secure
multiplex network coding” to mean “strong security” used in
secure network coding.
After we submitted the original manuscript in 2012, one
of the authors started and published another approach [30] to
the same problem as this paper. [30] proposed a deterministic
construction of universal secure multiplex network coding and
its security analysis also valid for dependent and non-uniform
multiple messages, while the proposed construction in this
paper is probabilistic. However, when multiple messages are
dependent or non-uniform, the construction and the security
analysis in [30] cannot ensure the mutual information to the
eavesdropper arbitrarily small, which makes the construction
in [30] less useful for dependent or non-uniform messages. As
far as the authors know, only the construction in the present
paper can ensure arbitrarily small mutual information to the
eavesdropper when multiple messages are dependent or non-
uniform.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews related
results used in this paper, and a slightly new terminology
“secure multiplex network coding”. Section III introduces the
strengthened version of the privacy amplification theorem and
the proposed scheme for secure network coding. Section IV
concludes the paper.
Part of this paper was reported as earlier proceedings papers
[33], [34]. We substantially rewrote our security proof in [34]
so that we can analyze the security with dependent and non-
uniform multiple secret messages, which was not done in [34].
We borrowed ideas from [33, Section IV] and extended them
in Appendix B so that we can prove Lemma 5.
II. Preliminary
A. Model of network and network coding and two-universal
hash functions
As in [3], [8], [11], [23], [35], [36] we consider the single
source multicast, and assume the linear network coding [29],
[31]. The source node is assumed to have at least n outgoing
links. For i = 1, . . . , n, the source node generates a packet
Pi consisting of m symbols in Fq, and transmits an Fq-
linear combination of P1, . . . , Pn to each outgoing link, as
explained in [18, Section 2.1]. At an intermediate node, only
packets generated at the same time by the source node are
linearly combined, as explained in [18, Section 2.5]. The linear
combination coefficients at each node are fixed so that all the
legitimate receivers can decode n packets P1, . . . , Pn from the
source node. In this paper, we assume that all of sink nodes
have respective decoders to recover all of the nm transmitted
symbols. Since all of legitimate receivers can recover the
message without error due to this assumption, we do not need
to discuss the decoding error probability, and focus on the
security.
If the random linear network coding [26] is employed, we
have to also include so-called encoding vectors in each packet
Pi [18, Section 2.2]. We ignore those encoding vectors because
they do not carry secret information.
Hereafter, we shall only consider the eavesdropper Eve and
forget about the multiple legitimate receivers. The n packets
3P1, . . . , Pn carry in total mn symbols in Fq. We shall propose
a method encoding secret information into mn symbols by
the source node. The mn symbols obtained by the proposed
method are distributed to packets P1, . . . , Pn.
Eve can eavesdrop µ links. We assume µ ≤ n throughout
this paper. The total number of eavesdropped symbols is
therefore mµ. The set of µ eavesdropped links is assumed
to be fixed during packets P1, . . . , Pn are traveling on the
network, as assumed in [35], [36]. The situation considered
here also includes the conventional store-and-forward network
as a special case.
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [12]
for the privacy amplification theorem introduced later.
Definition 1: Let F be a set of functions from a finite set
S1 to another finite set S2, and F a random variable on F . If
for any x1 , x2 ∈ S1 we have
Pr[F(x1) = F(x2)] ≤
1
|S2|
, (1)
then F with the probability distribution of F is said to be a
family of two-universal hash functions.
B. Security definitions
In this subsection, we review the existing security criteria,
and introduce our security criterion. We also discuss the
relation among security criteria because the same terminology
is used to mean different criteria.
Definition 2 (Strongly secure network coding): [23] Let m =
1, and S 1, . . . , S T ∈ Fq be messages with T ≤ n. We denote by
S T+1, . . . , S n ∈ Fq randomness not intended as messages. A
network coding is said to be η-strongly secure if the following
relation holds for any 0 ≤ µ ≤ n. When Eve’s observation Z is
obtained by eavesdropping µ links, any I ⊂ {1, . . . , T } with
µ − η ≤ T − |I| satisfies
I(S I; Z) = 0,
where S I = [S i : i ∈ I] and I(S I; Z) denotes their mutual
information as defined in [14].
The parameter η is equivalent to k in [23]. Harada and
Yamamoto [23] showed a procedure to construct (n − T )-
strongly secure network coding under the uniformity and
independence assumption on the messages S 1, . . . , S n. Bhattad
and Narayanan [3] introduced the weak security for network
coding that requires I(S i; Z) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
We want to consider the universal security studied in [35],
[36], and also want to use multiple symbols in a single packet
Pi, that is, m > 1. So we introduce our version of universal
strong security, by following the approach initiated by Silva
and Kschischang [35], [36].
Definition 3: Assume that we are given a linear network
coding for single source multicast. Assume also that linear
coding at intermediate nodes and the set of µ eavesdropped
links are fixed when packets P1, . . . , Pn travel from the source
node to all the legitimate receivers. Suppose that we have T+1
messages S 1, . . . , S T+1 and S i ∈ F
ki
q . S T+1 denotes randomness
not intended as a message. We assume
∑T+1
i=1 ki = mn. A linear
transformation of S 1, . . . , S T+1 at the source node is said to
be a universal (ǫ, η)-secure multiplex network coding if the
following relation holds for all linear coding at intermediate
nodes and for any 0 ≤ µ ≤ n. When Eve’s observation Z
corresponds to µ eavesdropped links, any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . ,
T } with m(µ − η) <
∑
1≤i≤T+1,i<I ki satisfies
I(S I; Z) ≤ ǫ, (2)
where S I = [S i : i ∈ I].
Readers may observed that the above secure multiplex
network coding with ǫ = 0 is almost the same as the strong
security in [23]. The reason for using a different name is as
follows. In the study of wiretap channel coding, we usually
consider a sequence of encoders and decoders for block length
m = 1, 2, . . . . the weak security in the wiretap coding
means limm→∞ I(S , Z)/m = 0, where S is the message of
the wiretap coding and Z is the received sequence by the
eavesdropper. The strong security in the wiretap coding means
limm→∞ I(S , Z) = 0. Since those meanings of the weak and
strong security in the wiretap coding are different from the
secure network coding, we introduced a different terminology
in Definition 3 to reduce unnecessary confusion.
III. Universal secure multiplex network coding
A. Strengthened privacy amplification theorem
In order to evaluate the mutual information to Eve when
the sum rate of multiple secret information is large, we need
to strengthen the privacy amplification theorem originally
appeared in [2], [25] as follows. The below new privacy
amplification theorem enables an upper bound (8) on the
mutual information when the mutual information grows with
m instead of converging to zero.
The following proposition is a slightly enhanced version of
[34, Theorem 2].
Proposition 4: Let A1 and A2 be discrete random variables
on finite sets A1 and A, respectively, and F a family of
functions from A1 to A3. Let F be a random variable on
F . Assume that A1 and F are conditionally independent given
A2, and that for any fixed realization a2 of A2, the conditional
probability distribution of F given a2 satisfies the condition
for a family of two-universal hash functions. Then we have
E f [exp(ρI(F(A1); A2|F = f ))] ≤ 1 + |A3|
ρE[PA1 |A2(A1|A2)
ρ]
(3)
for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, where E f [·] denotes the expectation of · with
f being the random variable. We use the natural logarithm for
all the logarithms in this paper, which include ones implicitly
appearing in entropy and mutual information. Otherwise we
have to adjust the above inequality.
Proof: Proof is given in Appendix A.
In our analysis of the security, we shall use Proposition 4
with A1 being the whole secret message, A2 being part of the
secret message whose secrecy we analyze, and F(A1) being
Eve’s observation.
B. Description of the proposed scheme and analysis with
randomized coding
The purpose of this section is to provide a universal
(ǫI , (kT+1/m−δρ))-secure multiplex network coding in the sense
4of Definition 3, where δρ is a parameter measuring conditional
non-uniformity to be defined in Eq. (12). The modified sense
means that the zero mutual information in Eq. (2) is relaxed
to the requirement that it can be made arbitrarily small. For
this purpose, in this subsection, we treat the coding scheme
with randomized coding. We assume that we have T secret
messages, which can be dependent or non-uniform, and that
the i-th secret message is given as a random variable S i
whose realization is a row vector in F
ki
q . We shall provide
upper bounds on the information leaked to Eve for all choices
of values of ki. We shall also use a supplementary random
message S T+1 taking values in F
kT+1
q when the randomness in
the encoder is insufficient to make S i secret from Eve. By S
we denote the entire collection (S 1, . . . , S T+1) of messages.
We assume mn = k1 + · · · + kT+1.
Let L be the set of all bijective Fq-linear maps from∏T+1
i=1 F
ki
q to itself, and L the uniform random variable on L
statistically independent of S = (S 1, . . . , S T+1), and arbitrary
fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. The source node store LS t into
packets P1, . . . , Pn defined in Section II-A and send them via
its n outgoing links, where t denotes the transpose of a vector.
Our modified construction just adds a bijective linear precode
to an existing network code. Note that attaching a random
linear function was first proposed in [8] for the secure network
coding. This coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The legitimate sender and all the legitimate receivers agree
on the choice of L. The eavesdropper Eve may also know
their choice of L. Choice of L is part of protocol specification,
the chosen L is repeatedly used, and agreement on its choice
among legitimate sender and receivers is not counted as
consumption of the network bandwidth. A legitimate receiver
can recover S 1, . . . , S T , S T+1 by multiplying L
−1 to his/her
received information. By the assumption on Eve, her informa-
tion can be expressed as BLS t by using an mµ×mn matrix B
over Fq as in [35], [36].
For the nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, denote the collection of
random variables [S i : i ∈ I] by S I, denote [S i : i ∈ {1, . . . ,
T + 1} \ I] by S
I
, and let kI =
∑
i∈I ki.
For a fixed realization ℓ of L, the information gained by
Eve is measured by the mutual information I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ),
which is common practice in the information theoretic security
[5], [32]. Since its average Eℓ[I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)] is the
conditional mutual information I(S I; BLS
t|L) [14], we will
upper bound I(S I; BLS
t|L). After upper bounding the average
I(S I; BLS
t|L) in Eq. (5), we can ensure that for most choices
of ℓ and all possible B, I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ) is small, as done in
Eq. (11).
In order to use Proposition 4, we introduce a lemma.
Lemma 5: For fixed B, the family of mapping S 7→ BLS t
is a family of two-universal hash functions to the rank(B)-
dimensional Fq-linear space.
Proof: See Appendix B.
We can upper bound I(S I; BLS
t|L) as follows, by applying
Proposition 4 with A1 = S , A2 = S I, and F(A1) = BLS
t.
Observe that the assumption in Proposition 4 holds because
S I is part of S and L is independent of S .
Eℓ[exp(ρI(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ))]
≤ 1 + qmρ×rank(B)E[PS |S I(S |S I)
ρ]
= 1 + qmρ×rank(B)E[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]
≤ 1 + qmρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]. (4)
From Eq. (4) we have
ρI(S I; BLS
t|L)
= ln exp(ρI(S I; BLS
t|L))
≤ lnEℓ[exp(ρI(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ))]
≤ ln(1 + qmρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ])
≤ qmρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]. (5)
Fix a real number C1 > 1. Equation (5) and the Markov
inequality yield that
Pr[ℓ ∈ LI,1] < 1/C1
for any single nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, where LI,1 := {ℓ |
I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ) > C1Eℓ[I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)]}. Thus,
Pr[ℓ ∈ ∪I:I,∅LI,1] < (2
T − 1)/C1.
This means that there is at least a probability of 1−(2T −1)/C1
such that a realization ℓ of L satisfies
I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)
≤ C1Eℓ[I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)]
≤ C1q
mρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]/ρ (6)
for all the (2T − 1) nonempty subsets I of {1, . . . , T }.
Defining another subset LI,2 := {ℓ | exp(ρI(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)) >
C1Eℓ[exp(ρI(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ))]}, by Eq. (4) and the Markov
inequality we obtain
Pr[ℓ ∈ ∪I:I,∅(LI,1 ∪ LI,2)] < 2(2
T − 1)/C1.
Therefore, a realization ℓ of L satisfies both Eq. (6) and
exp(ρI(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)) ≤ C1(1 + q
mρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]).
(7)
with probability at least 1 − 2 × (2T − 1)/C1.
Equation (7) implies
I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)
m
=
1
m
ln exp I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ)
≤
lnC1
mρ
+
1
mρ
ln(1 + qmρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]) (by Eq. (7))
≤
lnC1
mρ
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣µ ln q +
1 + lnE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]
mρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
, (8)
where in Eq. (8) we used ln(1 + exp(x)) ≤ |1 + x|+ = max{0,
1 + x}.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we have the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 6: Recall that the eavesdroppingmµ×mn matrix
B is fixed, that L is the uniform random variable on L
statistically independent of S = (S 1, . . . , S T+1), and that a
real number C1 > 1 is arbitrarily fixed. There is at least a
probability of 1−2×(2T −1)/C1 such that information leakage
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Fig. 1. Proposed coding scheme for the universal secure multiplex network coding
I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ) to Eve with the chosen realization ℓ of L
satisfies both inequalities (6) and (8) simultaneously.
The previous proposition does not ensure the universal
security in the sense of [35], [36] because it only considers a
fixed eavesdropping matrix B. To ensure the universal security,
we must consider all the possible eavesdropping matrix B,
which shall be done in the next two subsections.
C. Evaluation of the number of different kinds of eavesdrop-
ping
In the following, we considered the case when the matrix
B corresponds to µ eavesdropped links. Such a case can be
mathematically formulated as follows. Let xi, j ∈ Fq be the j-
th symbol in the i-th packet Pi defined in Section II-A. Then
there exists a µ × n matrix Bµ×n such that what are observed
by Eve at the j-th symbols in her eavesdropped µ packets is
expressed as Bµ×n(x1, j, . . . , xn, j)
t for j = 1, . . . , m. Without
loss of generality we may assume rank(Bµ×n) = µ because if
rank(Bµ×n) = µ
′ < µ then such a case can be regarded as only
µ′ links being eavesdropped. Then, the mµ × mn matrix2 B is
completely determined by Bµ×n.
In order to show the universal security in Definition 3, we
need to ensure that the mutual information is small for any B
and any 0 ≤ µ ≤ n. For this purpose, we need to count the
number of different kinds of eavesdropping.
We consider the set B(µ) of all possible mµ × mn matri-
ces B that characterize Eve’s eavesdropping with the above
restriction. Then, we define an equivalence relation ∼ on B(µ)
as B1 ∼ B2 for B1, B2 ∈ B(µ) if there exists an invertible
function f such that f (B1LS
t) = B2LS
t for all L and S t. That
is, B1 ∼ B2 if and only if the kernel of B1 is the same as that
of B2. Since B1 and B2 are determined by µ × n matrices, the
space B(µ)/ ∼ is the set of the (n− µ)-dimensional subspaces
in Fnq. The space is called Grassmannian and the number is
evaluated in the following way [17]
|B(µ)/ ∼ | =
µ−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qµ − qi
≤
µ−1∏
i=0
qn − qµ−1
qµ − qµ−1
=
µ−1∏
i=0
qn−µ+1 − 1
q − 1
≤
µ−1∏
i=0
qn−µ+1 = qµ(n−µ+1) ≤ q
(n+1)2
4 (9)
because (x − z)/(y − z) is monotonically increasing in z when
x > y > z > 0. The final inequality follows from the inequality
2Mathematically, the mµ × mn matrix B is written as Bµ×n ⊗ Im×m.
√
µ(n − µ + 1) ≤
µ+n−µ+1
2
= n+1
2
. Hence, the total number of
equivalence classes excluding B(0) is upper bounded as
n∑
µ=1
|B(µ)/ ∼ | ≤ nq
(n+1)2
4 . (10)
D. Universally secure multiplex network coding
Next, using the above discussion, we show the existence of
universal secure multiplex networking coding. Due to (10), the
probability of L satisfying Eqs. (6) and (8) simultaneously for
all possible B is at least
1 − 2 × (2T − 1) × nq
(n+1)2
4 /C1. (11)
Recall that chosen L is part of protocol specification and re-
peatedly used. Because Eqs. (6), (8) and (11) are independent
of realization of the random variable S representing secret
information, Eqs. (6) and (8) are satisfied in every repeated
use of L with probability at least Eq. (11).
The upper bound (6) can go to either zero or ∞ as m→ ∞.
When the upper bound (6) goes to ∞, the information leakage
to Eve grows linearly with m and its growth rate with m
will be analyzed by Eq. (8). Firstly, we need to clarify under
what condition Eq. (6) converges to zero as m → ∞. To do
so, we shall introduce a version of conditional Rényi entropy
introduced in [25]. There seems to be no standard definition
for the conditional Rényi entropy, for example, definitions in
[2] and [22] disagree and our definition in [25] is different
from [2], [22]. For discrete random variables X, Y, define
conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + ρ as
H1+ρ(X|Y) = −
lnE[PX |Y(X|Y)
ρ]
ρ
.
For ρ = 0, we define H1(X|Y) as limρ→0 H1+ρ(X|Y). By using
l’Hôpital’s rule we see that H1(X|Y) is equal to the conditional
Shannon entropy. Observe also that H1+ρ(X|Y) = logq |X| if X
is conditionally uniform given Y, where X denotes the alphabet
of X. We note that E[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ] = eH1+ρ(S I |S I).
In order to clarify under what condition Eq. (6) converges to
zero, we need to assume some knowledge on PS
I
|S I(S I|S I).
We consider the situation in which each message S i originates
from a different organization and it is compressed before
network coded. Even after compression, it is known that S 1,
. . . , S T are not completely uniform [24], and we must allow
certain degree of statistical dependence among S 1, . . . , S T and
their non-uniformity. In this paper we consider secure network
coding separately from source coding of S i.
6Let δρ be a nonnegative constant such that
n −
kI
m
−
H1+ρ(S I|S I)
m ln q
≤ δρ (12)
for some 0 < ρ ≤ 1, for all I, and for sufficiently large m.
Observe that if all messages S i’s are uniform and independent
then δρ = 0. The parameter δρ captures the deviation from
the uniform and independent situation in terms of conditional
Rényi entropy per the number m of symbols in single packet.
By taking the natural logarithm of Eq. (6), we see
ln [RHS of Eq. (6)]
= ln
C1
ρ
+ mρ(µ ln q +
lnE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]
mρ
)
= ln
C1
ρ
+ mρ(
(∗)︷                ︸︸                ︷
µ −
H1+ρ(S I|S I)
m
) ln q. (13)
When
µ < (n −
kI
m
) − δρ i.e.
kI
m
< n − µ − δρ, (14)
(∗) in Eq. (13) becomes negative by Eq. (12). Under such
condition Eq. (13) converges to −∞ as m→ ∞, which means
that the upper bound Eq. (6) can be made arbitrary small by
letting m be large.
Secondly, we shall analyze how much information Eve can
gain when Eq. (14) does not hold. In such case we use the
other upper bound Eq. (8). We can rewrite Eq. (8) as
RHS of Eq. (8)
=
1 + lnC1
mρ
+ µ ln q −
H1+ρ(S I|S I)
m
≤
1 + lnC1
mρ
+ (µ − (n −
kI
m
− δρ)) ln q (by Eq. (12)).
We see that we can make the upper bound Eq. (8) on
I(S I ;BLS
t |L=ℓ)
m
arbitrary close to
(µ + δρ − (n −
kI
m
)) ln q (15)
by letting m be large.
Observe that the assumption (14) is equivalent to the as-
sumption of Definition 3 with η = kT+1/m − δρ. By summa-
rizing the previous discussion, we can construct a universal
secure multiplex network coding in the sense of Definition 3
as follows:
Theorem 7: For any ǫp, ǫI > 0 and sufficiently large m, a
random choice of mn × mn matrix L gives with probability
at least 1 − ǫp a universal (ǫI , kT+1/m − δρ)-secure multiplex
network coding.
Remark 8: The condition (14) for almost zero mutual infor-
mation can become true for µ = 1 if δρ < n−
kI
m
− 1, which is
equivalent to H1+ρ(S I|S I)/(m ln q) > 1. A sufficient condition
for (14) to hold for µ = 1 is that the conditional Rényi entropy
of S
I
given S I is > ln q for some ρ, which is equivalent
to S
I
has at least one Fq symbol of conditional randomness
given S I. So we can see that the previous argument can ensure
almost zero mutual information with messages very far from
independence and uniformity.
Remark 9: The meaning of C1 is as follows: At Eqs. (4) and
(5), there might not exist a realization ℓ of L that satisfies Eqs.
(4) and (5) for all subsets I of {1, . . . , T } simultaneously. By
sacrificing the tightness of the upper bounds, we ensure the
existence of ℓ satisfying Eqs. (6) and (7) for all I.
Remark 10: Under the assumption that all messages S 1, . . . ,
S T+1 are uniform and independent, the mutual information can
be made exactly zero for every eavesdropping matrix B. The
reason is as follows: For fixed B and L = ℓ, we have
I(S I; BLS
t|L = ℓ) = H(S I|L = ℓ) − H(S I|BLS
t, L = ℓ). (16)
The first term H(S I|L = ℓ) is an integer multiple of ln q since
S I is assumed to have the uniform distribution. Let αI be
the projection from
∏T+1
i=1 F
ki
q to
∏
i∈I F
ki
q for ∅ , I ⊆ {1,
. . . , T }. For fixed B and ℓ, and a given realization z of
BℓS t, the set of solutions s such that z = Bℓs is written as
ker(Bℓ)+ some vector v. This means that the set of possible
candidates of S I given realization z of BℓS
t is written as
αI(ker(Bℓ)) + αI(v), and S I given realization z is uniformly
distributed on αI(ker(Bℓ)) + αI(v). Since the cardinality of
αI(ker(Bℓ)) + αI(v) is independent of ℓS
t for fixed B and ℓ,
the second term H(S I|BLS
t, L = ℓ) is also an integer multiple
of ln q. Therefore, if Eq. (6) holds for every B as verified
in Eq. (11) and the RHS of Eq. (6) is < ln q, then the LHS
of Eq. (6) must be zero. Observe that under this assumption
our modified construction is a universal (0, kT+1/m)-secure
multiplex network coding in the exact sense of Definition 3.
The parameter kT+1/m is optimal according to [7].
E. Evaluation of the required resource
In this subsection, we evaluate the amount of required
resource in our proposal. One can make convergence of Eq.
(6) arbitrarily slow by decreasing the difference between LHS
and RHS of Eq. (14), which makes evaluation of required size
of m very difficult.
To overcome the above difficulty, we consider (ǫI , kT+1/m−
δρ− ǫµ)-secure multiplex network coding, with which we have
to ensure small mutual information only for µ < n − kI/m −
δρ − ǫµ. This assumption makes the difference between LHS
and RHS of Eq. (14) at least ǫµ, which enables us to provide
an upper bound on m.
Proposition 11: For given n, q, T , ρ, δρ, ǫI , ǫp and ǫµ,
m ≥
(n+1)2
4
+ logq(2n(2
T − 1)) − logq(ρǫpǫI )
ρǫµ
is sufficient to ensure that a random choice of L gives an
(ǫI , kT+1/m − δρ − ǫµ)-secure multiplex network coding with
probability at least 1 − ǫp.
Proof: By Eq. (11) we have to choose C1 with
C1 ≥ 2 × (2
T − 1) × nq
(n+1)2
4 /ǫp. (17)
By Eq. (13), to make the mutual information ≤ ǫI , we see
ln
C1
ρ
− mρǫµ ln q ≤ ln ǫI (18)
7is sufficient. The condition (18) is equivalent to
m ≥ (ln
2 × (2T − 1) × nq
(n+1)2
4
ρǫpǫI
)/(ρǫµ ln q)
⇔ m ≥
(n+1)2
4
+ logq(2n(2
T − 1)) − logq(ρǫpǫI)
ρǫµ
We comment on the required field size and the com-
putational complexity of code construction of our proposal
and previous proposals realizing the security. The proposed
construction works with any given field size q, as well as [30],
[35]. The required sizes of q in [3], [23] are not explicitly given
but they seem quite large.
Instead of increasing q, we need to increase m to satisfy the
maximum allowable mutual information to the eavesdropper,
as shown in Proposition 11. Proposition 11 indicates that
a small value of ǫµ makes the required size of m large,
because smaller ǫµ makes the convergence of Eq. (6) slower.
In [35], m ≥ n is sufficient for explicit construction of a
code, and in [30] m ≥ 2n is sufficient, while neither [30],
[35] realizes almost zero mutual information with dependent
or non-uniform multiple messages.
The complexity of code construction of our proposal is m2n2
because of the random choice of mn × mn matrix. The codes
in [30], [35] are the Gabidulin codes [21] of length n over Fqm
and construction of an encoding matrix at the source node can
be done in m2n2 arithmetic operations in Fq. We note that for
small ǫµ the required size of m in our proposal can be much
larger than [30], [35]. The complexities of code constructions
in [3], [23] are not given but they seem quite large.
F. Numerical example of explicit computation of required
block size m
In this section we give a numerical example of computing
required block length m in order to ensure the mutual infor-
mation is below some value. In order to do so, we need an
estimate of E[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]. We assume to have δ0.5 = 0.5
in Eq. (12) at ρ = 0.5.
Let q = 256, n = 10, µ = 3, T = 5, ki = 2m for all i. We
do not have S T+1. We want to ensure that we choose ℓ with
probability at least 1−10−12 such that I(S i; BLS
t|L = ℓ) < 10−6
for all i = 1, . . . , 5. By Eq. (11) we choose C1 as
2 × nq
(n+1)2
4 (2T − 1)/C1 = 10
−12
⇔ C1 = 2 × 10 × 256
112/4(2T − 1)1012
By using δρ, we can upper bound the RHS of Eq. (6) as
follows:
C1q
mρµE[PS
I
|S I(S I|S I)
ρ]/ρ
= C1 expq(mρ(µ +
H1+ρ(S I|S I)
m ln q
)/ρ
≤ C1 expq(mρ(µ − n + kI/m + δρ))/ρ (by Eq. (12)).(19)
In order to keep the above upper bound to be below 10−6 we
have to choose
C1 expq(mρ(µ − n + kI/m + δρ))/ρ < 10
−6
⇔ m > −
logq(10
6C1/ρ)
ρ(µ − n + kI/m + δρ)
⇔ m > −
log256(10
6 × 2 × 10 × 256121/4(25 − 1)1012/0.5)
0.5(3 − 10 + 2 + 0.5)
⇐ m ≥ 17.3373
This means that we can choose m = 18 and should choose
the matrix L at least as large as 180 × 180 over F256, which
is implementable. Recall that we assumed n = 10 outgoing
(logical) links from the source node and that each outgoing
link carries m = 18 symbols in single coding block in this
example. We note that the above computation corresponds to
the case ǫI = 10
−6, ǫp = 10
−12 and ǫµ = 4.5 in Proposition 11,
and realizes (10−6, −5)-secure multiplex network coding in
the sense of Definition 3 with probability 1−10−12. Relatively
small m comes from the choice of ǫµ = 4.5. If we want to
realize the same level of security for any triple of S 1, . . .S 5
instead of single S i, then ǫµ becomes 0.5 and the required size
of m becomes 9(= 4.5/0.5) times larger than this example,
which realizes (10−6, −1)-secure multiplex network coding.
Since δρ > 0, we cannot realize (ǫp, 0)-secure multiplex
network coding without use of the dummy message S T+1,
which is not used in this example.Use of the dummy message
S T+1 also decreases the required size of m.
Remark 12: A vector in Fmnq can be identified with an
element in Fqmn , and multiplication by a nonzero element in
Fqmn is an Fq-linear mapping and can be identified with an
element in L. Let LFqmn be a commutative subgroup of L
whose elements can be identified with nonzero elements in
Fqmn . By looking at the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix B, we
can see that LFqmn can be used in place of L in our modified
construction. Necessary storage space to record choice of an
element in LFqmn is that of mn Fq symbols and is smaller than
that of L. Matrix multiplication by an element in LFqmn is at
least as fast as that in L.
IV. Conclusion
In the secure network coding, there was loss of information
rate due to inclusion of random bits at the source node. Weakly
and strongly secure network coding [3], [6], [23], [35] remove
that loss of information rate by using multiple messages to
be kept secret from an eavesdropper, which require huge
computational complexity in code construction or huge finite
field size. In addition to this, the previous studies assumed
uniform and independent multiple messages, which seems
too strong assumption in practice. In this paper, we have
shown that random linear transform of multiple messages at
the source node realizes the strongly secure (called secure
multiplex network coding in this paper) network coding with
arbitrary high probability with sufficiently large block length.
We did not assume uniformity nor independence in multiple
messages. Our numerical example in Section III-F showed that
“sufficiently large block length” can be small. We studied the
secure network coding from separately the source coding of
messages. Joint source and network coding might improve the
performance, but we leave the study of such a joint encoding
as a future.
8Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4
In order to show Proposition 4, we introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 13: Under the same assumption as Proposition 4,
we have
E f [exp(−ρH(F(A1)|A2, F = f ))] ≤ |A3|
−ρ + E[PA1 |A2(A1|A2)
ρ]
(20)
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 4:
E f [exp(ρI(F(A1); A2|F = f ))]
= E f [exp(ρH(F(A1)|F = f )︸              ︷︷              ︸
≤logq |A3|
−ρH(F(A1)|A2, F = f ))]
≤ E f [|A3|
ρ exp(−ρH(F(A1)|A2, F = f ))]
≤ |A3|
ρ(|A3|
−ρ + E[PA1 |A2(A1|A2)
ρ]) (by Eq. (20))
= 1 + |A3|
ρE[PA1 |A2(A1|A2)
ρ].
Proof of Lemma 13: Fix a2 ∈ A2. The concavity of x
ρ
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 implies
E f
[ ∑
a3∈A3
P f (A1)|A2(a3|a2)
1+ρ
]
= E f
[ ∑
a3∈A3
P f (A1)|A2(a3|a2)︸            ︷︷            ︸
=
∑
a1∈ f
−1(a3)
PA1 |A2 (a1 |a2)
P f (A1)|A2(a3|a2)
ρ
]
= E f
[ ∑
a1∈A1
PA1 |A2(a1|a2)
∑
a′
1
∈ f−1( f (a1))
PA1 |A2(a
′
1|a2)
ρ
]
=
∑
a1∈A1
PA1 |A2(a1|a2)E f
[ ∑
a′
1
∈ f−1( f (a1))
PA1 |A2(a
′
1|a2)
ρ
]
≤
∑
a1∈A1
PA1 |A2(a1|a2)
(
E f
[ ∑
a′
1
∈ f−1( f (a1))
PA1 |A2(a
′
1|a2)
]
︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
(∗∗)
)ρ
. (21)
For a fixed realization a2 of A2, by the assumption in Propo-
sition 4 two random variables F and A1 are statistically
independent, which implies the distribution of f in (**) is
independent of a1. Since f is chosen from a family of two-
universal hash functions defined in Definition 1, we have
P(a′
1
∈ F−1(F(a1)) \ {a1}) ≤ 1/|A3| for a1 , a
′
1
∈ A1 and
(∗∗) = E f
[
PA1 |A2(a1|a2) +
∑
a′
1
∈ f−1( f (a1))\{a1}
PA1|A2(a
′
1|a2)
]
≤ PA1 |A2(a1|a2) +
∑
a1,a
′
1
∈A1
PA1|A2(a
′
1
|a2)
|A3|
≤ PA1 |A2(a1|a2) + |A3|
−1.
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x+y)ρ ≤ xρ+yρ
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we have
(PA1 |A2(a1|a2) + |A3|
−1)ρ ≤ PA1 |A2(a1|a2)
ρ + |A3|
−ρ. (22)
By Eqs. (21) and (22) we can see
E f
[ ∑
a3∈A3
P f (A1)|A2(a3|a2)
1+ρ
]
≤
∑
a1∈A1
PA1 |A2(a1|a2)
1+ρ + |A3|
−ρ.
Taking the average over A2 of the both sides of the last
equation, we have
E f [EA1A2[P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2)
ρ]] ≤ EA1A2[PA1|A2(A1|A2)
ρ]+|A3|
−ρ.
(23)
Define g(ρ) = EA1A2[P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2)
ρ] as a function of ρ
with fixed f and PA1A2 , and h(ρ) = ln g(ρ). We have
g′(ρ) = EA1A2[P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2)
ρ ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2)],
g′′(ρ) = EA1A2[P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2)
ρ(ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2))
2],
h′(ρ) = g′(ρ)/g(ρ),
h′′(ρ) =
g′′(ρ)g(ρ) − [g′(ρ)]2
g(ρ)2
.
Define (A′
1
, A′
2
) to be the random variables that have the same
joint distribution as (A1, A2) and statistically independent of
A1 and A2. To examine the sign of h
′′(ρ) we compute
g′′(ρ)g(ρ) − [g′(ρ)]2
= EA1A2A′1A
′
2
[P f (A1)A2 ( f (A1), A2)
ρP f (A1)A2 ( f (A
′
1), A
′
2)
ρ
{(ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2))
2
− ln P f (A1)|A2(A1|A2) ln P f (A1)|A2(A
′
1|A
′
2)}]
=
1
2
EA1A2A′1A
′
2
[P f (A1)A2( f (A1), A2)
ρP f (A1)A2( f (A
′
1), A
′
2)
ρ
{(ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2))
2 + (ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A
′
1)|A
′
2))
2
− 2 ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2) ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A
′
1)|A
′
2)}]
=
1
2
EA1A2A′1A
′
2
[P f (A1)A2( f (A1), A2)
ρP f (A1)A2( f (A
′
1), A
′
2)
ρ
{ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2) − ln P f (A1)|A2( f (A
′
1)|A
′
2)}
2]
≥ 0.
This means that h′′(ρ) ≥ 0 and h(ρ) is convex. We can see
EA1A2[P f (A1)|A2( f (A1)|A2)
ρ] = exp(h(ρ))
≥ exp( h(0)︸︷︷︸
=0
+ρh′(0))
= exp(−ρH( f (A1)|A2)). (24)
By Eqs. (23) and (24) we see that Eq. (20) holds.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 5
We shall prove Lemma 5 in this Appendix. Let L be a
subgroup of the group of all bijective linear maps on Fmnq . For
~x ∈ Fmnq , the orbit O(~x) of ~x under the action of L is defined
by
O(~x) = {L~x | L ∈ L}.
Lemma 14: Let ~x, ~y be two different vectors belonging to
O(~z). We have
|{L ∈ L | L~z = ~x}| = |{L ∈ L | L~z = ~y}|.
Proof: Let K ∈ L such that K~x = ~y. We have
|{L ∈ L | L~z = ~x}|
= |{L ∈ L | KL~z = K~x}|
= |{L ∈ L | KL~z = ~y}|
9= |{L ∈ L | L~z = ~y}|.
Lemma 15: Let B be an mµ×mn matrix, ker(B) = {~x ∈ Fmnq |
B~x = ~0}, and im(B) = {B~x | ~x ∈ Fmnq }. The family of functions
{BL | L ∈ L} with uniformly distributed L is a family of two-
universal hash functions from Fmnq to im(B) if and only if
|O(~v) ∩ ker(B)|
|O(~v)|
≤
1
|im(B)|
for all ~v ∈ Fmnq \ {~0}.
Proof: With the uniform distribution on L, LHS of Eq.
(1) is equal to
|{L ∈ L | BL~x1 = BL~x2}|
|L|
=
|{L ∈ L | BL(~x1 − ~x2) = ~0}|
|L|
=
|{L ∈ L | L(~x1 − ~x2) ∈ ker(B)}|
|L|
=
|{L ∈ L | L(~x1 − ~x2) ∈ O(~x1 − ~x2) ∩ ker(B)}|
|{L ∈ L | L(~x1 − ~x2) ∈ O(~x1 − ~x2)}|
=
|O(~x1 − ~x2) ∩ ker(B)|
|O(~x1 − ~x2)|
(by Lemma 14).
Renaming ~x1 − ~x2 to ~v proves the lemma.
Proposition 16: If L is the set of all bijective linear maps
on Fmnq , then {BL | L ∈ L} with uniformly distributed L is a
family of two-universal hash functions from Fmnq to im(B).
Proof: For a nonzero ~v ∈ Fmnq , we have O(~v) = F
mn
q \ {
~0},
which implies
|O(~v)| = |Fmnq | − 1,
|O(~v) ∩ ker(B)| =
|Fmnq |
|im(B)|
− 1.
By Lemma 15 we can see that the proposition is true.
Proof of Lemma 5: Lemma 5 is equivalent to Proposition
16.
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